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LAWYER ADVERTISING AND
SOLICITATION: THE BIRTH OF THE
MARLBORO MAN
WADE H. LOGAN, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
For many members of the legal profession, the "barbarians are at
the gate."1 Since the mid-1970s it has become clear that commercial
speech is protected by the First Amendment.2 Despite the acceptance
of this basic premise, the debate over lawyer advertising and solicita-
tion has raged unabated for two decades, frequently generating more
heat than light. The spectrum runs from those who wish that the attor-
ney general, like his medical cousin, somehow could require a dis-
claimer that legal advertising is dangerous to the health of the client
and the legal profession, to those who feel that ambulance chasing,
both personal and corporate, is a desirable form of consumerism.
This Article will discuss the case law background of the contro-
versy, the history of attempts to regulate lawyer advertising and solici-
tation, and the limited empirical evidence of the effect of those prac-
tices. Further, this Article will suggest that, since effective enforcement
of any detailed regulation may be a practical impossibility, legal adver-
tising should be restricted to the dissemination of basic information
about an attorney's practice.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
A. Bates v. State Bar 3
The Bates case was the first important case in which the United
States Supreme Court discussed lawyer advertising. The petitioners in
Bates opened a law office and called it a "legal clinic." They envisioned
handling only routine matters for persons of moderate income who did
* Partner, Holmes & Thomson, Charleston, South Carolina. A.B. 1966, University
of North Carolina; J.D. 1969, University of South Carolina.
1. B. BURROUGH & J. HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR
NABIsco (1990).
2. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
3. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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not qualify for governmental legal aid. Petitioners intended to charge
relatively low fees by using standardized forms, paralegals, automatic
typewriting equipment, and by handling a large volume of cases. They
placed an advertisement in a local newspaper offering their legal assis-
tance and listing their fees for certain routine services. The state bar
filed a grievance. The Supreme Court of Arizona upheld the conclusion
of a three-member Special Local Administrative Committee that the
advertisement in question violated Arizona's version of DR 2-101(B). 4
The United States Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari. Speak-
ing for the majority in a five-to-four decision, Justice Blackmun held
that the operation of Arizona's version of DR 2-101(B), which effec-
tively prohibited lawyer advertising, violated the First Amendment.,
Justice Blackmun preliminarily remarked that "commercial speech
serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of
products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system. In short, such
speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed
and reliable decision making."'s The Court acknowledged three issues it
was not called upon to decide. First, the case was not an advertising
claim related to the quality of petitioner's legal services. Second, the
case did not involve in-person solicitation by a lawyer or a "runner."
Third, neither DR 2-102 nor Arizona's Rule 29(a) prohibited the adver-
tisement of basic factual information such as the attorney's name, ad-
dress, telephone number, and office hours.7 The majority found that
such "spartan fare would provide scant nourishment" for the hungry
potential legal consumer.s
4. Id. at 354-56. Arizona has adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity DR 2-101(B) and it provided in part:
(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or
magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display adver-
tisements in the city or telephone directories or other means of commercial
publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
Aniz. S. CT. R. 29(a). The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted by the
American Bar Association on January 1, 1970, with amendments, was adopted by the
South Carolina Supreme Court as the standard of professional conduct for attorneys
admitted to practice in South Carolina. DR 2-101(B) remained in effect until the su-
preme court adopted a version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, effective
September 1, 1990. See S.C. App. CT. R. 407, Rule 7.2.
5. Bates, 433 U.S. at 355. The Supreme Court also unanimously held that the
petitioner's Sherman Act claim was barred by the doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943), but this portion of the holding is beyond the scope of this Article.
6. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364 (citation omitted).
7. Id. at 366; see also MODEL CODE OF PROmESSIONAL RESPONsmIrrY DR 2-
102(A)(6) (1969).
8. Bates, 433 U.S. at 367.
[Vol. 42
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The narrow holding of Bates is that a state may not constitution-
ally prohibit truthful advertising of the availability and cost of certain
routine legal services. The Court, in the absence of a factual record
from the court below, rejected the following arguments that favor the
blanket restriction of attorney advertising: (1) the adverse effect on
professionalism, (2) the inherently misleading nature of attorney ad-
vertising, (3) the adverse effect on the system of justice, (4) the unde-
sirable economic effect of advertising, (5) the adverse effect of advertis-
ing on the quality of service, and (6) the difficulties of enforcement.9
The Court held that the particular advertisement at issue was not
misleading. The Court also stated in dicta that certain limitations on
lawyer advertising could be constitutionally permissible, including
prohibitions against misleading or deceptive advertising. These limita-
tions might include advertisement of the quality of legal services,
prohibitions against in-person solicitation, and a requirement of a dis-
claimer or warning. 10 The Court also noted that a state might impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising,
and it alluded to the "special problems" of advertising in the electronic
broadcast media.1'
All four of the dissenting justices expressed grave misgivings about
the majority's unsupported assumption that the machinery of the
bench and bar could regulate lawyer advertising effectively. Justice
Powell's dissent includes what has to rank as the understatement of
the legal century. He concluded that "within undefined limits today's
decision will effect profound changes in the practice of law, viewed for
centuries as a learned profession."' 2 Justice Rehnquist discerned that
differentiations between protected and unprotected speech in the field
of advertising have been abandoned in favor of case-by-case adjudica-
tion. He made reference to the "slippery slope" upon which the Court
embarked, a concern which has proven to be prophetic.' 3
B. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association 14
The Supreme Court donned its cleats and checked its slide down
the slippery slope in Ohralik, decided the year after Bates. Speaking
for six of the eight justices who participated in the decision, Justice
Powell answered one of the questions reserved in Bates. The Court
9. Id. at 368-79.
10. Id. at 383-84.
11. Id. at 384.
12. Id. at 389.
13. Id. at 405.
14. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
1991]
3
Logan: Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation: The Birth of the Marlboro Ma
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
held that a state might constitutionally prohibit the in-person solicita-
tion of a client for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to involve
damages that the state had a right to prevent. 15
Ohralik involved a classic set of circumstances-an attorney solic-
iting an automobile collision victim in-person, while the victim laid in
traction still in the hospital. The attorney also solicited a passenger
who had been injured in the same accident, by visiting her, without
invitation, at her home. Both women verbally agreed to representation,
but later repudiated their agreements. Ohralik insisted they had bind-
ing oral agreements and brought breach of contract actions against the
women. Both the victim and the passenger eventually filed griev-
ances.' 6 After a hearing before the Board of Commissioners on Griev-
ances and Discipline, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that Ohralik's
conduct was not constitutionally protected, and suspended him
indefinitely.
17
On appeal the United States Supreme Court particularly seemed
concerned that in-person solicitation provides opportunities for over-
reaching, misrepresentation, and other forms of harm to the solicited
client, because in-person solicitation can afford the lawyer an opportu-
nity to exert pressure and demand an immediate response. The Court
noted that the "aim and effect of in-person solicitation may be to pro-
vide a one-sided presentation and to encourage speedy and perhaps
uninformed decisionmaking .. . ."I' The Court acknowledged that, ac-
cording to Bates, an informed decision can be aided by legal advertis-
ing.10 In-person solicitation, particularly of an "unsophisticated, in-
jured, or distressed lay person, '20 however, is not conducive to
informed, reasoned decision-making. Moreover, this type of solicita-
tion, unlike advertising, is not susceptible to public scrutiny and is not
easily regulated. The Court found that these concerns compelled a re-
straint on speech.2"
15. Id. at 458-62.
16. Id. at 449-52. The Court noted that Ohralik made secret tape recordings of his
conversations with both the victim and passenger.
17. Id. at 447.
18. Id. at 457.
19. Id. at 457-58.
20. Id. at 465.
21. Id. at 462; see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978)(solicitation may be per-
missible if it is in writing, related to a civil rights matter, and the attorney's primary
motive is not pecuniary gain).
[Vol. 42
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C. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission
22
Although this case did not directly involve lawyers, Central Hud-
son had important implications for lawyer advertising. The New York
Public Service Commission ordered public utilities to stop advertising
to promote the use of electricity during a fuel shortage in the winter of
1973-1974. A few years later, after the fuel crisis had abated, the Com-
mission, as a conservation measure, extended its prohibition on promo-
tional advertising. 23 The Commission distinguished between "promo-
tional" advertising, intended to stimulate sales, and "institutional and
informational" advertising, which it defined as any advertising not in-
tended to promote sales.
2 4
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Com-
mission to extend the ban,25 finding that promotional advertising does
not contribute to the sort of informed decision-making discussed in
Bates. The court of appeals also held that the governmental interest in
the conservation of electrical power outweighed the value of the type of
commercial speech in question.26
In Central Hudson Justice Powell observed that the Constitution
affords less protection to commercial speech than to other forms of ex-
pression secured by the First Amendment, and the constitutional con-
cern for commercial expression is based on the speech's informational
function.2 7 The Court determined that if the commercial speech is not
misleading, then the government's power to regulate it is more circum-
scribed, requiring a state to set forth a substantial governmental inter-
est to be served by its restriction on speech.21 Consequently, the pro-
posed regulation must advance the state interest involved directly; if a
more limited restriction would be as effective in advancing the govern-
mental interest, then the broader regulation cannot survive constitu-
tional scrutiny.2 9
The Court held that a court examining a particular regulation of
commercial speech must employ a four-part test: the court must (1)
discern whether or not the speech is protected by the First Amend-
ment (at a minimum, it must concern lawful activity and not be mis-
22. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
23. Id. at 558.
24. Id. at 560.
25. Id. at 561; see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530 (1980).
26. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
27. Id. at 563.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 564.
1991]
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leading), and (2) resolve whether or not the governmental interest to
be advanced is a "substantial" one. If both of the first two questions
are answered affirmatively, the court must then (3) determine whether
or not the proposed regulation directly advances the substantial gov-
ernmental interest; and (4) decide whether the regulation is more ex-
tensive than necessary to accomplish the advancement of the interest.30
If the regulation fails any one of these four prongs of the analysis, it
will not pass constitutional muster.
Applying the test to the ban on promotional advertising by electric
utilities, the Court in Central Hudson found that the advertising was
constitutionally protected, that New York's interest in conserving en-
ergy was a substantial governmental interest, and that the conservation
of energy was advanced directly by the ban on promotional advertis-
ing.3 The Court also found, however, that a blanket suppression of all
advertising was broader than required to further the state's interest in
energy conservation, so that the regulation violated the First Amend-
ment.3 2 The Court, as it did in Bates, suggested that certain forms of
more limited regulation, such as restricting the content and format of
the advertising, requiring the inclusion of information about the rela-
tive expense of the service in question, and instituting a system
whereby attorneys would preview their advertisements to ensure that
they would not defeat the policy in question, might be permissible.
33
D. In re R.M.J2
In 1977, in an attempt to comply with Bates, the Supreme Court
of Missouri revised its version of DR 2-101(B). The revised rule speci-
fied the categories of information that a lawyer might publish. As en-
forced, the rule prohibited the publication of any material other than
specific information, such as fees charged for ten particular "routine"
services. In addition, the rules listed twenty-three areas of practice
that might properly be included in the advertisement and prohibited
lawyers from indicating that they "limited" their practice to these ar-
eas. DR 2-101(B) also required that attorneys disclaim any certification
or expertise in the practice areas. A separate rule, DR 2-102, limited
the categories of persons to whom professional announcements could
be mailed.35
30. Id. at 566.
31. Id. at 566-71.
32. Id. at 570-71.
33. Id.
34. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
35. See id. at 194 & nn.3-6.
[Vol. 42
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In In re R.M.J. the attorney allegedly violated a number of the
provisions of Missouri's DR 2-101(B) by publishing information in
newspaper and Yellow Pages advertisements not allowed expressly by
the rule, and by failing to include a disclaimer of certification or exper-
tise, which was required after the attorney listed his areas of practice.
He also advertised in capital letters that he was a member of the Bar
of the Supreme Court of the United States. 3 The Supreme Court of
Missouri upheld the constitutionality of DR 2-101(B) and issued a pri-
vate reprimand.
37
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Powell reversed. Justice
Powell found that Missouri's revised rule failed to withstand the con-
stitutional analysis he had articulated in Central Hudson.38 The Court
noted that the state identified no substantial interest in restricting a
lawyer from advertising the number of areas of his practice or a listing
of jurisdictions in which he is licensed to practice. Further, the Court
found the state advanced no reason to restrict a lawyer from mailing
announcement cards. The Court discovered little in the record to artic-
ulate a substantial governmental interest, and it did not find a less
restrictive alternative to serve any interests asserted.39
Following the pattern of earlier decisions, the Court again
bemoaned the lack of an adequate record in the court below, and indi-
cated that its holding was based, at least in part, upon the lack of such
a record.40 The Court again felt compelled to catalogue certain forms of
constitutionally appropriate restrictions. The Court suggested that a
state might require that all general mailings by an attorney be filed
with a regulatory body, that a copy of these mailings be maintained by
the attorney for some limited time period, or that the attorney could
be required to stamp "This is an advertisement" on the envelope in
which the materials were mailed.
4 1
E. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
4'
The petitioner in Zauderer ran an advertisement in a local news-
36. Id. at 196. Interestingly, petitioner's failure to include the required disclaimer
regarding his lack of expertise apparently did not form the basis for the imposition of
discipline, and this issue was not brought out in the appeal. Id. at 205 n.18.
37. In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 191 (1982). The Mis-
souri Supreme Court did not address the constitutionality of DR 2-102 regarding profes-
sional announcement cards.
38. 455 U.S. at 203; see supra text accompanying note 30.
39. Central Hudson, 455 U.S. at 205-06.
40. Id. at 205-07.
41. Id. at 206-07.
42. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
1991]
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paper stating that he would represent clients in drunk driving cases
and that he would refund the full fee if the client were convicted.
Later, he ran another newspaper advertisement announcing his willing-
ness to represent women who had been injured by the use of the
Dalkon Shield intrauterine device (the advertisement featured a draw-
ing of the device). He declared, among other things, that "no legal fees
are owed by our clients,' 3 if the client did not recover. After the law-
yer's discipline had been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio,
44
Zauderer appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Justice White wrote the opinion for a divided Court. Referring fre-
quently to the analytical framework suggested by Justice Powell in
Central Hudson,4 5 the Court held that Ohio could not constitutionally
prohibit the solicitation of legal business through an advertisement
which contained advice and information about a specific legal problem,
such as the Dalkon Shield litigation, nor could it restrict the use of
illustrations in advertisements by lawyers, provided, of course, that
such advertisements were neither misleading nor deceptive.46 The
Court held that Ohio could constitutionally require a lawyer to disclose
to a client that the client is liable for costs under a contingent fee
agreement.'7 The lawyer apparently did not appeal Ohio's prohibition
against contingent fees in criminal cases. The Court upheld Zauderer's
discipline for that violation in spite of his due process challenge.4
The Court's holding re-emphasized some old themes. It mentioned
the Ohralik distinction between printed materials and personal solici-
tation.49 It rejected the notion that truthful, nondeceptive advertising
may be a basis for attorney discipline simply because it may have a
tendency to encourage the filing of lawsuits.5 0 The opinion questioned
whether or not a state's desire that attorneys maintain "dignity in
their communications with the public is an interest substantial enough
to justify the abridgement of their First Amendment rights."" As in
prior decisions, the Court addressed the lack of any empirical evidence
43. Id. at 630.
44. Id. at 635; see also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d
44, 461 N.E.2d 883 (1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
45. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637-38. Justice Powell did not participate in the
Zauderer decision. For a discussion of Central Hudson, see supra notes 22-33 and ac-
companying text.
46. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637-38.
47. The Court rejected the lawyer's contention that a disclosure requirement, as
opposed to a blanket prohibition of advertising, should be subject to a "least restrictive
means" analysis. Id. at 651 n.14.
48. Id. at 654-55.
49. Id. at 642.
50. Id. at 643.
51. Id. at 648.
[Vol. 42
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on the state's part to support its contentions regarding the effect of
lawyer advertising.5 2 The petitioner apparently presented evidence in
the proceeding below, including expert testimony regarding the benefi-
cial economic effects of advertising, as well as testimony from two of
his clients that they would have been unaware of their Dalkon Shield
claims in the absence of his advertisements.
5 3
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, expressed the view that a state properly could prohibit at-
torneys from using unsolicited legal advice to obtain clients.5 ' The dis-
sent is significant in that it established the continuation of Justice
Rehnquist's pattern of dissenting in lawyer advertising cases. It also
marked Justice O'Connor's first dissent in such a case.
F. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association 5
In 1988 Justice Brennan, writing for a Court increasingly divided
on the issue of lawyer advertising and solicitation, held in Shapero
that the Kentucky Supreme Court could not, by rule, completely pro-
hibit Kentucky lawyers from soliciting legal business for pecuniary
gain if the lawyers sent truthful and nondeceptive correspondence to
potential clients known to face particular legal problems. Six members
of the Court agreed with that proposition. A majority of the Court
could not agree, however, on whether the particular letter in question
was overreaching and therefore unworthy of First Amendment protec-
tion. Justice O'Connor wrote a lengthy dissent, joined by Justices
Rehnquist and Scalia, that criticized the whole line of attorney adver-
tising and solicitation cases, and suggested that Bates should be re-
examined.5"
The petitioner in Shapero had sought an advisory opinion con-
cerning the ethical propriety of a letter that he proposed to send to
potential clients whose homes were threatened with foreclosure. The
Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that its existing rule prohibiting
targeted, direct-mail solicitation was invalidated by Zauderer.7 The
court substituted Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.355 for
52. Id. Justice Brennan pointed out that the Court consistently has struck down
regulations when a state has failed to produce evidence in support of its contentions. Id.
at 659 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 634.
54. Id. at 673.
55. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
56. Id. at 480-91.
57. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
58. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(b) (1983) provides, in part,
that lawyers may not solicit professional employment from prospective clients by written
1991]
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its existing rule, and held that the proposed letter violated Rule 7.3.
The Kentucky Bar Association did not argue that the letter was false
or misleading.8 9 Instead, the lawyer was disciplined because direct-tar-
get mailings presented the potential for overreaching, undue influence,
and intimidation when the targeted audience is vulnerable and already
may be overwhelmed by legal problems.60 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court decided that the proper focus should not be on the
susceptibility of potential clients, but on whether "the mode of com-
munication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such
susceptibility.""1
Justice Brennan again emphasized the Ohralik distinction be-
tween written, mailed materials and in-person solicitation, and sug-
gested ways that a state could constitutionally regulate mailings, such
as requiring attorneys to file these letters with a state agency for re-
view.62 He also referenced the lack of evidence in the record to support
the state's contentions. The opinion tacitly approves the practice of a
lawyer searching the public records for automobile accident reports or
mortgage foreclosure complaints, and then writing the victims of those
accidents or the mortgagors to "volunteer" his services. 3
G. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission
64
In an extremely confusing decision, the United States Supreme
Court in Peel recently held that Illinois' DR 2-105(A)(3)6 5 violated the
First Amendment by completely prohibiting an attorney from advertis-
ing that he has been certified by private professional organizations.
The Supreme Court of Illinois disciplined the petitioner under DR 2-
105(A)(3) for mentioning his certification by the National Board of
Trial Advocacy (NBTA) on his letterhead.66 The Illinois Supreme
communication if the prospective client lets the lawyer know the client has no interest in
solicitation, or the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harassment.
59. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 479-80.
60. Id. at 474 (citing Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 726 S.W.2d 299, 301 (1987),
rev'd, 486 U.S. 466 (1988)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 476.
63. Id. at 477.
64. 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990).
65. ILLINOIS CODE OF PROrSSIONA RESPONsmmrrY DR 2-105(A) (3) provides:
A lawyer or law firm may specify or designate any area or field of law in which
he or its partners concentrates or limits his or its practice. Except as set forth
in Rule 2-105(a), no lawyer may hold himself out as "certified" or a
"specialist."
66. In re Peel, 126 IlM. 2d 397, 534 N.E.2d 980 (1989), rev'd sub nom. Peel v. Attor-
ney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990).
[Vol. 42
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Court held that the certification was similar to a claim of quality and
superiority and therefore it inherently was likely to mislead clients.
6 7
Justice Stevens, joined in the Peel opinion by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Kennedy, perceived the issue to be whether a lawyer
has a constitutional right to advertise an NBTA certification as a trial
specialist. First, the Court concentrated on whether the petitioner's
statement was misleading and thus unprotected by the First Amend-
ment under commercial speech standards. Second, the Court acknowl-
edged that commercial speech which potentially is misleading may cre-
ate a state interest substantial enough to justify regulation of the
speech.6 8
The Court rejected the notion that petitioner's advertising was
misleading or deceptive. The Court concluded that the speech was
truthful and verifiable by consumers, and that "disclosure of truthful,
relevant information is more likely to make a positive contribution to
decisionmaking than is concealment of such information."69 The Court
also determined that truthful statements about an attorney who is a
specialist or is certified in a field are no more misleading than the ad-
vertising permitted in R.M.J., Shapero, and Zauderer. The Court also
held that the state failed to show that a more narrow regulation could
not satisfy its interest in limiting the petitioner's speech. 0
The Court noted that certification by "objective and consistently
applied standards relevant to practice in a particular area of law"7
1
both enhanced consumers' ability to make informed decisions and en-
couraged attorneys to use meritorious certification programs.72 Based
on this reasoning, the Court remanded the case.
Justices Marshall and Brennan found the letterhead to be poten-
tially misleading and thus subject to state regulation. They noted that
facts can be misleading if they are presented without adequate expla-
nation, a particular problem in this case because the NBTA is not a
commonly recognized organization.7 3 They concurred in the judgment,
however, because they determined that Illinois' blanket prohibition of
potentially misleading commercial speech under DR 2-105(A) was
67. Id. at 406, 534 N.E.2d at 984. The state supreme court also held that a juxtapo-
sition on the petitioner's letterhead of the NBTA certification and his being "licensed"
in three states implied official licensure. It also held the use of the word "specialist"
implied formal authorization by the state.
68. Peel, 110 S. Ct. at 2287.
69. Id. at 2292.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2293.
73. Id. at 2295.
1991]
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unconstitutional. 4
Justice White also found the letterhead to be potentially mislead-
ing, but dissented in the opinion. Justice White found it inappropriate
that the petitioner was free to circulate a potentially misleading letter-
head until the state was able to fashion a more narrow regulation. Ac-
cording to Justice White, the petitioner had the responsibility to elimi-
nate the letterhead's potential to mislead. 5
Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia all found the petitioner's
letterhead to be inherently misleading. Their dissent argued that ordi-
nary consumers of legal services could not verify easily the petitioner's
statements. They also asserted that because the certification could not
be presented in a nondeceptive manner, an absolute prohibition by the
state was acceptable.76
Once again, the Court pointed out the lack of empirical evidence
to support the state's claim of deception.7" Notably, the "traditional"
dissenters, Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist and Scalia, were joined for
the first time by Justice White.
H. Trends in the Case Law
These cases demonstrate that a growing number of Justices on the
Supreme Court may believe that the Court's rulings in the area of law-
yer advertising, beginning with Bates, should be re-examined. The
Court has emphasized that the basis for First Amendment protection
of commercial expression such as lawyer advertising is the speech's in-
formational character, which supposedly contributes to enlightened de-
cision making by the public.78 The Court has taken pains, in dicta, to
suggest constitutionally permissible forms to regulate advertising and
solicitation.
7 9
III. ATTEmPTs AT REGULATION
The fast pace of the Supreme Court's opinions in the area of law-
yer advertising and solicitation frequently has outrun the ability of
state regulatory authorities to conform to them.80 At least three states
74. Id. at 2293.
75. Id. at 2297.
76. Id. at 2300.
77. Id. at 2290.
78. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comrn'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
79. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988); In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191, 200-04 (1982); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977).
80. Bates was decided in 1977; Ohralik in 1978; Central Hudson in 1980; In re
[Vol. 42
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have tried to enact rules that effectively regulate attorney advertising
practices, while at the same time, comply with the Court's constitu-
tional requirements.
A. Iowa
Iowa's experiences illustrate a state's attempt to comply with the
Supreme Court decisions. Following the 1977 Bates opinion, the Iowa
Supreme Court asked the Committee on Professional Ethics and Con-
duct of the Iowa State Bar Association to investigate lawyer advertis-
ing and to recommend an advertising rule. The Iowa Supreme Court
adopted a version of DR 2-101(B) which prohibited television adver-
tisements that contained background sound, visual displays other than
those allowed in print, more than one "non-dramatic" voice, and self-
laudatory statements. A lawyer who views the rule as unduly restrictive
may petition the court to have the rule modified through an expedited
appeal procedure."1
In 1982 three Iowa lawyers aired television commercials that pur-
portedly violated DR 2-101(B)(5).8 2 The Committee requested the
Iowa Supreme Court to enjoin the continued use of the advertisements.
The court found the rule to be constitutional and issued an
injunction.8 3
In its decision, the Iowa Supreme Court discussed the applicable
United States Supreme Court opinions, including Bates, Ohralik,
R.M.J., and Central Hudson. Applying constitutional analysis, it found
that the television commercials were misleading because the advertise-
ments failed to inform prospective clients that they might be liable for
costs even in contingent fee arrangements. The commercials also con-
tained self-laudatory comments about the expertise of the advertising
lawyers.
8 4
The Iowa Supreme Court made the excellent point that a line
should be drawn between advertising that informs the public, and
therefore promotes the kind of enlightened decision making applauded
in Bates, and advertising that merely promotes the lawyer.8 5 The court
found that the commercials at issue primarily promoted the lawyers
rather than provided relevant information to the public.
R.M.J. in 1982; Zauderer in 1985; Shapero in 1988; and Peel in 1990.
81. IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B).
82. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v.
Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565, 568-69 (Iowa 1984), vacated and remanded, 472 U.S. 1004
(1985), reh'g denied, 476 U.S. 1165 (1986).
83. Id. at 571.
84. Id. at 570.
85. Id. at 571.
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Taking a cue from the United States Supreme Court, the Iowa Su-
preme Court appointed a judge as a commissioner and developed a de-
tailed factual record. 6 The evidence apparently included the results of
a public survey in which a group of people were shown television com-
mercials for lawyers and questioned about their attitudes about law-
yers, both before and after watching the advertisements.87 Following
the viewing, the opinions held by the group regarding lawyers changed
for the worse. Those who perceived that lawyers were trustworthy, for
example, dropped from seventy-one percent to fourteen percent; those
who considered lawyers to be honest dropped from sixty-five percent to
fourteen percent.88
The lawyers appealed to the United States Supreme Court. While
the case was on appeal, Zauderer was decided. The United States Su-
preme Court vacated the judgment of the Iowa Supreme Court and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Zauderer
decision.89
On reconsideration, the Iowa Supreme Court again ordered that
the injunction issue.9° It concluded that the Zauderer opinion did not
affect electronic media advertisements.91 The Iowa court noted that the
United States Supreme Court had acknowledged the unique problems
involved in electronic broadcasts requiring special consideration. 2 The
court expressed concern that electronic media advertising presented "a
very strong potential for abuse"9' 3 and explained that it had tried to
draw a line between "the dissemination of protected information and
crass personal promotion." '4
Not surprisingly, the lawyers appealed again, but the Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question.95
Under the doctrine of Hicks v. Miranda,98 such a dismissal is consid-
ered a decision on the merits of a case.
After the United States Supreme Court's decision in Shapero v.
86. Id. at 567.
87. Reynoldson, The Case Against Lawyer Advertising, 75 A.B.A. J. 60 (1989).
88. Id.
89. Humphrey v. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State Bar
Ass'n, 472 U.S. 1004 (1985).
90. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n v.
Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 114 (1986).
91. Id. at 645.
92. Id. (citing Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977)).
93. Id. at 647.
94. Id.
95. Humphrey v. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State Bar
Ass'n, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986).
96. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
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Kentucky Bar Association,9 7 the Supreme Court of Iowa again
amended Iowa's version of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The changes particularly impacted advertising in telephone directories,
city directories, and by direct mail.98 This amendment followed an-
other public opinion survey prepared for the Iowa Bar Association.9
Effective June 1, 1989, the Supreme Court of Iowa amended DR 2-
101, 2-102, and 2-105 of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility.
DR 2-101, "Publicity," was modified to include strict requirements on
the language of advertising, the method of dissemination, the informa-
tional content, and the fee information content. 00 DR 2-101 also pro-
vides that the advertisement must contain a disclaimer. 1'0 Moreover,
print media advertising must be disseminated in the geographic area
where the lawyer maintains offices or where a significant part of the
lawyer's clientele resides. Prior to mailing a written solicitation, the
lawyer must file a copy of the proposed solicitation with a committee
of the Iowa State Bar Association. As suggested in Zauderer, the envel-
ope in which a written advertisement or solicitation is mailed must
have printed on it the words "ADVERTISEMENT ONLY.'' 2 If the
particular written communication suggests the institution of litigation,
it must disclose that filing a suit solely to harass or to coerce a settle-
ment may be illegal and could render the plaintiff liable for malicious
prosecution or abuse of process in a civil suit.'0 3 To date, no appellate
court has ruled on the constitutionality of these new provisions.
B. Florida
The Florida Bar followed the general procedure adopted in Iowa.
Following an extensive study of attorney advertising and solicitation
97. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
98. Order, "In the Matter of Rules DR 2-101, DR 2-102, and DR 2-105 of the Iowa
Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers," April 28, 1989 (forwarded to members
of Iowa Bar under cover of letter from Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of
Iowa State Bar Association dated May 1, 1989).
99. FRANK N. MAGID Assoc., INC., CONSUMER ATrrruDES TOWARD Yellow Pages LE-
GAL ADVERTISING (1988).
100. For example, lawyers must use "restrained subjective characterizations" of
rates or fees, such as the term "reasonable." IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-101(A).
101. The disclaimer must read: "The determination of the need for legal services
and the choice of a lawyer are extremely important decisions and should not be based
upon advertisements or self-proclaimed expertise. This disclosure is required by rule of
the Supreme Court of Iowa." Id.
102. Id. DR 2-101(B)(4)(d).
103. Id. DR 2-101(F).
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practices in Florida,10 4 the Florida Bar Board of Governors, on July 20,
1989, voted in favor of proposals to circumscribe severely advertising
by lawyers, much in the fashion of the Iowa rule. For example, all ad-
vertising, whether print or electronic, would be required to include a
disclaimer similar to the disclaimer required in Iowa. Restrictions on
television advertising were even more severe than under the Iowa rule.
Direct mail solicitation by personal injury lawyers would be banned
entirely, although other attorneys, such as bankruptcy practitioners,
could have engaged in direct mail solicitation. In November 1989 the
bar filed a petition with the Florida Supreme Court asking that the
rules be adopted.
By a divided decision, the Florida Supreme Court in a lengthy or-
der adopted the new rules in a modified form.'05 The court's order,
which became effective January 1, 1991, eliminated the proposed re-
quirement that only a member of the Florida Bar could be a spokes-
person for the firm advertising in a television commercial. It also elimi-
nated the requirement of a disclaimer or disclosure in electronic
advertising, and modified the total ban on direct-mail solicitation in
personal injury cases. 06 A number of parties, including advertising or-
ganizations, filed opposition to the new rules. Thus far, no appellate
court has ruled on the constitutionality of the new Florida rules.
C. South Carolina
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, as adopted and
amended by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association,
previously governed the professional conduct of lawyers admitted to
practice before the Supreme Court of South Carolina. 10 7 One South
Carolina attorney has been disbarred and another publicly repri-
manded for advertising services in a manner that violated DR 2-102.101
In In re Burgess'09 an attorney placed advertisements in The
State newspaper regarding his bankruptcy practice. Citing Bates v.
104. See, e.g., THE COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH CENTER, FLA. STATE UNIV., THE RE-
SULTS OF THE FLORIDA BAR PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY (1987).
105. The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990).
106. Id. Direct mail solicitation in personal injury cases is prohibited for the first
thirty days after the accident.
107. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 2-101.
108. Another attorney was reprimanded publicly after he received a separate public
censure in New York for advertising in a Syracuse, New York telephone directory "in a
manner which constituted a holding out to the public of specialization in areas of law in
which he had no experience." In re Zimmerman, 277 S.C. 342, 342, 287 S.E.2d 474, 474
(1982).
109. 279 S.C. 44, 302 S.E.2d 325 (1983).
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State Bar,110 the court acknowledged that lawyer advertising was pro-
tected speech, but reaffirmed that states have a legitimate interest in
regulating this type of speech."" The court held that the attorney's
advertising violated DR 2-101 because it did not "further the legiti-
mate aim of attorney advertising, which is to educate the public and
facilitate intelligent selection of counsel, and not merely to attract cli-
ents.1 122 The court also found the attorney's advertising campaign in-
creased the attorney's practice to such an extent that he was unable to
respond properly to his clients' needs.11-3 A divided court publicly repri-
manded the attorney for advertising in The State newspaper regarding
his bankruptcy practice.
The majority in In re Hodges" 4 found an attorney's advertise-
ments to be "remarkably similar" to those disapproved of in Bur-
gess." 5 Justices Gregory and Harwell dissented, however, and asserted
that Hodges's advertisement was neither false nor misleading. The dis-
sent also noted that the advertisement was directed at a particular lay
audience and written in terms laypersons could understand, and thus
was valuable to the consuming public."16
The Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards of the
American Bar Association proposed that the ABA adopt the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct to replace the Model Code, and in 1983
the Model Rules were adopted by the House of Delegates of the ABA.
The South Carolina Bar petitioned the South Carolina Supreme Court
to adopt the Model Rules. While that petition was pending, Shapero
was decided. The South Carolina Bar suggested that Rule 7 of the
Model Rules be modified to conform to the holding in Shapero."
7
Prior to its decision on the petition, the South Carolina Supreme
Court, recognizing the problem of enforcing the existing rule in light of
Shapero, amended Rule 32 to delete EC 2-9 through EC 2-16 and DR
2-101 through DR 2-105, and added Rules on Lawyer Advertising.1 18
110. 433 U.S. 350 (1977); see supra notes 3-13 and accompanying text.
111. Burgess, 279 S.C. at 45, 302 S.E.2d at 325-26.
112. Id. at 46, 302 S.E.2d at 326.
113. Id. The attorney previously had been publicly reprimanded, In re Burgess, 275
S.C. 315, 270 S.E.2d 436 (1980), and thus possibly received a harsher sanction than may
have been imposed had this been his first appearance in a disciplinary proceeding. Bur-
gess, 279 S.C. at 47, 302 S.E.2d at 326.
114. 279 S.C. 128, 303 S.E.2d 89, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960 (1983).
115. Id. at 129, 303 S.E.2d at 89.
116. Id. at 130, 303 S.E.2d at 89-90.
117. Brief In Support of Petition to Adopt the Proposed South Carolina Model
Rules of Professional Conduct to Replace the Code of Professional Responsibility as
Rule 32 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, Nathan M. Crystal, Esquire, Attorney for
Petitioner, February 1, 1989.
118. Order re: Rules on Lawyer Advertising, Supreme Court of South Carolina, June
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The Model Rules, as modified, were adopted by the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court on January 9, 1990, to become effective September
1, 1990.19 They are now codified as Rule 407 of the South Carolina
Appellate Court Rules. The Rules on Lawyer Advertising are contained
in Rule 7.1. Although no empirical evidence was gathered as in Iowa
and Florida prior to South Carolina's adoption of the new rules, the
current standards for attorney advertising embrace restrictions on ad-
vertising and solicitation in a number of specific areas. Except for Rule
7.4, the limitations appear constitutionally permissible in light of the
applicable United States Supreme Court decisions discussed above.120
Rule 7.3, which deals with solicitation of prospective clients, con-
tains detailed requirements concerning disclaimers and the types of in-
formation that must be included in written or recorded communica-
tions from a lawyer to a prospective client.1 21 Rule 7.1, which addresses
communications concerning a lawyer's services, and Rule 7.2, which
treats advertising, are much less detailed. In light of the complete lack
of empirical evidence about how South Carolinians choose a lawyer,
this lack of detail is understandable.
IV. CONCLUSION
A review of a local newspaper or the Yellow Pages of a local tele-
phone directory demonstrates the increasingly pervasive nature and ef-
fect of lawyer advertising. The overwhelming majority of lawyer adver-
tising is promotional in nature, rather than the kind of informational
advertising which the Bates Court suggested would aid decision mak-
ing on the part of the legal consumer. For example, few newspaper ad-
vertisements list the fees for routine legal services, and even fewer ad-
vertisements in the Yellow Pages do so. If the purpose of lawyer
advertising is to inform the public about legal services, then the major-
ity of these advertisements fall far short of that goal.
The First Amendment does not prohibit a rule making mandatory
the inclusion of information that would assist a potential client. It is,
after all, its informational aspect that affords commercial speech lim-
ited First Amendment protection. The kind of information that would
12, 1989.
119. Order, Supreme Court of South Carolina, Jan. 9, 1990.
120. Rule 7.1, Communication Concerning a Lawyer's Services; Rule 7.2, Advertis-
ing; Rule 7.3, Direct Contact with Prospective Clients; Rule 7.4, Certified Specialization
and Limitation of Practice; and Rule 7.5, Firm Names and Letterheads. S.C. App. CT. R.
407, Rules 7.1-7.5. Rule 7.4 probably is not constitutional, in light of the decision in Peel
v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990). See supra
notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
121. S.C. Ap. CT. R. 407, Rule 7.3(c).
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assist a potential client in choosing a lawyer could be constitutionally
required in advertisements by lawyers. 22 Such a rule would at least
have the virtue of encouraging the sort of "informational" advertising
discussed in Central Hudson Gas.
123
The existing rule permits the public dissemination of certain kinds
of information, such as the types of services the lawyer will undertake,
the basis upon which the fees for those services are determined, and so
forth.12 4 A rule requiring the furnishing of such information would be
both beneficial and constitutional. Other mandated information might
include, for example, whether or not a client is responsible for costs in
a contingency fee case' 25 or the lawyer's years of experience. Either all
or part of the information now required to be included only in written
or recorded solicitations of employment from prospective clients"26 also
could be required in lawyer advertisements. A rule requiring this type
of information in both print and electronic lawyer advertising would be
more enforceable, as a practical matter, than a more detailed require-
ment about what should be excluded.
In South Carolina, enforcement of the Rules of Professional Re-
sponsibility is left in the first instance to the Board of Commissioners
on Grievances and Discipline and then to the Attorney General.
11
While the devotion of the volunteer members of the Commission to
their duties is beyond question, as is the competence of its staff, the
sheer volume of lawyer advertising means that effective enforcement of
more detailed prohibitions of certain kinds of conduct would be prob-
lematic, at best. The demands upon the Attorney General's resources
in this time of restrictive -budgets are ever increasing. The more effec-
tive regulation arguably would require the inclusion of certain types of
information specifically designed to assist the potential client.
The author is unaware of any sort of empirical evidence regarding
how South Carolinians select an attorney, or what the effect of lawyer
advertising and solicitation has upon the South Carolina public's per-
ception of lawyers and the legal system. The experiences of Iowa and
Florida teach us that some advertising practices may affect the percep-
tion of the public in general, and of jurors, in particular in ways that
may have an adverse impact upon our system of justice. Such research
would be an invaluable aid to our understanding of the most effective
means of regulating undesirable lawyer advertising.
122. Cf. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d
643 (Iowa 1985).
123. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
124. S.C. App. CT. R. 407, Rule 7.2 comment.
125. Id. Rules 1.5(c) & 1.8(e)(1).
126. Id. Rule 7.3.
127. S.C. App. CT. R. 413.
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